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    *The Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior District Judge for the District of New Jersey,
sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No.  05-3291
                              
SHYAM BHIKA SOLANKI,
          Petitioner
v.
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                         Respondent
                              
On Petition For Review From The Decision Of 
The Board Of Immigration Appeals
No. A95 369 103
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles M Honeyman
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 28, 2006
Before: AMBRO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
and IRENAS,* District Judge
(Filed May 18, 2006)
                              
OPINION
                              
    1  CAT has been implemented by regulations codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 and
208.18.
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IRENAS, Senior District Judge
Petitioner Shyam Bhika Solanki (“Solanki”) appeals the order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) opinion and order
denying Solanki’s application for asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal, 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).1 
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we have jurisdiction over this timely petition for review of
the BIA’s final determination.  For the reasons set forth below, we will deny the petition.
I.
Solanki is a Kenyan citizen of Indian ethnicity.  He was admitted to the United
States as a visitor on April 27, 2001, for a temporary period not to exceed November 26,
2001.  On January 7, 2002, Solanki applied for asylum and withholding of removal.  In
February, 2002, the Department of Homeland Security served Solanki with a Notice To
Appear, charging that he had exceeded the time he was permitted to remain in the United
States.  After conceding removability, Solanki asserted his asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT claims at a hearing before the IJ.  Specifically, Solanki asserted that, 
while in Kenya, he suffered persecution because of his Indian ethnicity and feared future
persecution if he returned to Kenya.  
In support of his case, Solanki recounted three separate robberies he suffered in
3Kenya.  In 1992, three unknown men of African descent robbed Solanki of approximately
120,000 Kenyan shillings, beating him and stabbing him in the torso with a knife. 
Solanki was conducting business at the time and the cash he carried was from a recent
transaction with a customer.  Solanki reported the crime to the police but the men were
never caught.
Similarly, in 1998, three unknown men entered Solanki’s car while he was looking
for a parking space near a bank.  They forced him to drive for approximately two hours to
Buruburu, located outside Nairobi.  Upon arrival, the three men ordered Solanki out of
the car and then kicked him and threw him to the ground, dislocating and fracturing his
shoulder.  They stripped him down to his underwear and then stole company money,
Solanki’s personal property (including rings and cash) and the car.  A passing motorist
drove Solanki to the police station where he reported the crime.   Approximately a year
later the police recovered the car but never found the attackers.
Solanki was robbed once again in 2000 while walking home from work.  A group
of unknown men of African descent pointed a gun at Solanki, forcing him to give them
his wallet.  The men threatened to kill Solanki if they ever saw him again.  This time
Solanki did not report the crime to the police.
Solanki believes he was a target of these attacks because he is an Indian and
Indians in Kenya are known to be businessmen.  Therefore, Solanki explained, Indians
are perceived to be wealthy by the poorer Kenyans, who are most often of African
    2  Solanki testified that most businesses in Kenya are owned by Indians: “Dunkin
Donuts, 7-11– everything is by Indian [sic].  The people who work under you is [sic] the
black people.”
    3  The nature of these threats is not described in the record.
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descent.2  Solanki also submitted the U.S. Department of State Country Report for Kenya
for the year 2000, which states: 
There is widespread resentment among the citizens of African ethnicity
toward Asians living in the country.  The Asian community constitutes
between 0.5 and 1 percent of the total population. . . . Many African
Kenyans resent persons of Asian descent for their affluence, and for
their reluctance to assimilate African culture and to employ blacks,
particularly in management positions.  They also see Asians as taking
jobs and commercial opportunities. . . . Politicians, both opposition and
ruling party, from time to time, appeal to the majority prejudices by
attacking Asian citizens, accusing them of exploiting and usurping the
natural inheritance of African citizens.
Solanki further testified that he was once fired from a management position
because he received anonymous threats,3 causing his boss to be concerned that the
business would be at risk if Solanki continued to work for him.
II.
Because the BIA affirmed without opinion the IJ’s order denying relief, we review
the IJ’s decision.  Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 322 (3d Cir. 2004).  Factual
findings must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.  Singh v. Gonzalez, 406
F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“administrative findings
of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to the
contrary”).  “If a reasonable fact finder could make a particular finding on the
    4  The IJ also held that the evidence did not establish a widespread “pattern or
practice,” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2), of persecution against Indians in Kenya on a
nationwide basis.  Solanki does not challenge this aspect of the IJ’s ruling; therefore, we
do not address it.
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administrative record, then the finding is supported by substantial evidence.  Conversely,
if no reasonable fact finder could make that finding on the administrative record, the
finding is not supported by substantial evidence.”  Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 322-23 (quoting
Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003)(en banc)).
III.
A.
The IJ held that Solanki was not eligible for asylum because the evidence did not
establish Solanki had personally suffered past persecution or had a well-founded fear of
future persecution.4  The IJ determined that the robberies and threats Solanki experienced
did not amount to persecution because nothing in the record “suggest[ed] that the
motivation [for the robberies and threats] was, even in part, on the basis of a protected
ground, such as a respondent’s race or, in this case, ethnicity as described as Indian.” 
“To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate past
persecution by substantial evidence or a well-founded fear of persecution that is both
subjectively and objectively reasonable.”  Singh, 406 F.3d at 195.  The persecution must
also be “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(emphasis added).
The IJ held, and we agree, that Solanki failed to establish the requisite connection
    5  Because we will deny the petition on other grounds, we assume without deciding that
Solanki’s injuries resulting from the robberies, along with the threat to his life, were
sufficiently severe to constitute persecution.  However, we note that this Court has
previously held that “[s]imple robbery, in isolation, while unfortunate and troubling, does
not seem to [constitute persecution]. . . . [T]wo isolated criminal acts, perpetrated by
unknown assailants, which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a
minor injury, is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution.”  Lie v. Ashcroft, 396
F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005); see also DeSouza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir.
1993)(holding that private racial discrimination and harassment of a Kenyan citizen of
Indian descent does not establish persecution).
    6  We further note that even if Solanki had submitted such evidence, that evidence by
itself probably would not be sufficient.  See Lie, 396 F.3d at 535 (a “single ethnic slur”
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or nexus between his ethnicity and the asserted persecution.5  Section 1101(a)(42)(A)
“‘makes motive critical.’”  Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 535 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting INS
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992)).  Thus, an applicant for asylum “‘must provide
some evidence of motive, direct or circumstantial.  And if he seeks to obtain judicial
reversal of the BIA’s determination, he must show that the evidence he presented was so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of
persecution.’” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Singh, 406 F.3d 191, 197 (“[A]n
applicant must show that the persecution was motivated, at least in part, by one of the
protected characteristics.”)(emphasis in original).
Here, Solanki’s evidence is almost entirely lacking with respect to motivation
based on his ethnicity.  Moreover, the evidence in the record certainly is not so
compelling for us to conclude that the IJ was unreasonable in failing to find that the
robberies resulted from even a mixed motive.  Solanki did not put forth any evidence that
any of his attackers ever uttered an ethnic slur or insult.6  Contrast Singh, 406 F.3d at
uttered during a robbery was insufficient to establish that the thieves were motivated by
the applicant’s ethnicity).
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198-99 (concluding that police officers who beat Singh were at least partially motivated
by his dissenting political opinions because they talked about his political activities while
they beat him and threatened to kill him if he continued his activities).  Nor was there any
particular character to the robberies and threats that would allow the inference that the
assailants’ actions were meant to convey a message consistent with hatred toward ethnic
Indians.
 We agree with the IJ that the only motivation disclosed by these three incidents,
which occurred over the span of approximately eight years, is a desire for wealth and
resentment towards those with wealth.  See also Patel v. Gonzalez, 126 Fed. Appx. 283,
291 (6th Cir. 2005) (non-precedential opinion) (holding that the robberies of Patel, a
Kenyan citizen of Indian descent, by Kenyans of African descent “were simply indicative
of resentment towards Patel due to his wealth. . . . As the Immigration Judge found, the
incidents of robbery are attributable to class tensions and Patel’s affluence, rather than to
persecution.”).  Therefore we conclude that the IJ’s decision with respect to Solanki’s
asserted past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution was supported by
substantial evidence.
B.
We also hold that the IJ’s decision denying withholding of removal and CAT
protection was supported by substantial evidence.  An applicant’s burden of proof with
8respect to both of these claims is significantly higher than his burden for an asylum claim. 
To obtain withholding of removal, an applicant must establish that it is more likely than
not that he will face persecution if he is deported.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Chen v.
Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004)(“An alien who fails to establish that he or she
has a well-founded fear of persecution, so as to be eligible for a grant of asylum,
necessarily will fail to establish the right to withholding of removal.”).  Similarly, an
applicant seeking CAT protection must establish that it is more likely than not that he
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.  Wang v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 347, 348 (3d Cir. 2004) (“the standard for invocation of the CAT is more stringent
than the standard for granting asylum”).  Because the evidence discussed above does not
establish that Solanki has a well-founded fear of persecution, we agree with the IJ that the
evidence is insufficient to support either a withholding of removal or CAT claim.
IV.
Based on the foregoing we deny Solanki’s Petition for Review in its entirety.
